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1.   Introduction 
Last 500 years witnesses the rising of  western capitalism. Many scholars devoted 
themselves with great passion in such huge and intriguing subject. At very beginning, the 
investigations were started at the economic analysis of  the society. The theoretical 
economists tried to measure the economic activities and well-functioning of  the society by 
two notions, so called: value and economy, which derived from the mathematical notions of  
‘quality’, ‘time’ and ‘energy’ 1 . It is what the theoretical economists done in their 
masterpieces2. Despite these early economists’ intention of  avoiding the involvement of  
human will, the further development of  the researches finally introduce the participation 
of  the notion of  human will, because of  the subjectivity and uncertainty in the 
measurement of  investigation. Hence, the economists started dealing with the relationship 
between human and nature to dealing with the relationship between the human beings. 
The introduction of  the legal notion at this stage is proper to facilitate the interpretation 
of  the economic activities and well-functioning of  the society for the economists. 
Acquiring from the legal scholars, the relationship of  human and nature is a matter of  
property and the relationship between the human beings is a matter of  contract, as 
Commons indicated in his works: 
 
“… both legal theory and economic theory, in modern times, have based their explanations first on 
Newton’s Principle of  Mechanism, then on Malthus’ Principle of  Scarcity, then on juristic Principles of  
Common Rules that both limit and enlarge the field for individual wills in a world if  mechanical forces 
and scarcity of  resources.”3 
 
The recognition and expansion of  property right, the emerging of  the corporation (also 
commonly called company) and the various forms of  transactions consists the three pillars 
of  modern capitalism. The commodities (goods) and legal tenders (money) are the bloods 
and wheels in the great circulation of  wealth in the society4. The human will is acting as a 
driver in the historical streamline to flourish the development of  the economy in the 
society. Meanwhile, the common-law courts played as a prudent judge to recognize those 
emerging notions and merchant customs, which have created the economic institutions 
and framework. In other words, the legal infrastructure lays the foundation of  western 
capitalism5. The securities with the wide scope to involve the negotiable instruments are 
the most role in the capitalism other than the invention of  corporation, however, its legal 
evolution and very nature has not clarified and investigated clearly. In general, the form of  
securities transformed from its very contract form to a property form which will be 
                                                
1 John Rogers Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism (Transaction Publishers 1924) 1. 
2 These researches usually called as Engineering Economics or Economics with the Principles of  Mechanism. These 
economists like Quesnay, Ricardo, Smith, etc., are all dealing with relationship between the human being and nature, 
which absorbed many methodologies and mechanisms from the scientism. See: Philip Mirowski, Against Mechanism: 
Protecting Economics from Science (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 1992). 
3 Commons, Legal foundations of capitalism (n 1) 7. 
4 Russell R Menard and John J McCusker, ‘The Great Wheel of Circulation’ [1978]. 
5 For the further discussion of  the statement See: Richard Theodore Ely and others, Property and Contract in Their Relations 
to the Distribution of Wealth (Macmillan 1914) vol 1. Cpt.1 
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discussed in the later part of  the paper. What’s more, the significance of  such 
transformation of  nature of  securities and legal responses to the dematerialization and 
immobilization will also be discussed. 
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2.  Economic Explanation of Securities in the Modern 
Capitalism Infrastructure 
2.1 Commodity Tickets and Price Tickets: Economic Category and Legal 
Rationale 
There are various categories for the modern capital market instruments6. Most of  them 
have their own legal rationales, like the category of  debt & equity market, public & private 
market, etc., but not all of  categories can conclude all types of  securities into the sets. The 
category of  money market & capital market is one of  finest way for the economists to put 
all types of  securities into the right place. Throughout all textbooks7 in finance, this 
category of  money market and capital market, from economists and financial professions’ 
points of  view, is concluded by the maturities and liquidity of  the securities. However, such 
category does not well clarify its legal rationale, the deliberation of  which is vital to conduct 
instead of  peripheral explanation by most economists and financial professions. 
 
Albeit, John Commons and his predecessors of  classical institutional economists have give 
a solid explanation on aforementioned category by using price tickets and commodity 
tickets, his comprehensive works are always underestimated and regarded as too 
descriptive8 by new institutional economists, those who mainly dwell on the analysis of  
transaction cost rather than the very foundation of  legal and social norms behind the 
economy. In this section, I will conduct an economic explanation of  the securities in the 
infrastructure of  the modern capitalism with application of  the Common’s theoretical 
framework of  price tickets and commodity tickets. 
 
Main distinctions between the capital market and money market, from economists and 
financial professions’ perspective, are the time to the maturity and the different pricing 
logics. Deriving from time to maturity, it is vital to identify that the liquidity of  money 
market instruments is better than those in capital market9. The instruments contain highest 
liquidity are the money like legal tender in most of  the countries, hard currency or bullion 
under Gold/Silver Standard. Lastly, the consensus needed to be reached is that the price, 
discussed here, are the price paid or cost of  certain amount of  other goods to acquire a 
right of  ownership, which is the precondition of  all the transactions including the 
                                                
6  In this paper, the securities as capital market instruments have a boarder scope which included the negotiable 
instruments like promissory note and bill of  exchange. 
7 See: Frank J Fabozzi and others, Foundations of Financial Markets and Institutions (4 edition, Prentice Hall 2009) 6. Frederic 
S Mishkin and Stanley Eakins, Financial Markets and Institutions: Global Edition (5th edition, Pearson 2006) 219. 
8 Coase indicated in his works that “Without a theory they had nothing to pass on expect a mass of  descriptive material 
waiting for a theory, or a fire.” See: Ronald H Coase, ‘The New Institutional Economics’ [1984] Z Für Gesamte Staatswiss 
Institutional Theor Econ 229, 230. 
9 Mishkin and Eakins (n 7) 219. 
IALS DISSERTATION                                                         Student No.1544802 
 6 
securities10. 
The distinction of  two pricing logics is the key to reasoning the economic and legal 
rationale for the categorization. According to the literature, MacLeod, H. D. is the first 
scholar identifying the pricing method for capital market instruments and money market 
instruments systematically. In his book The Theory and Practice of  Banking, he defined these 
two pricing methods as follows: 
 
(1)   “By advancing the complete sum, and waiting till the end of  the year for the Profit”11 is Interest. 
(2)   “By retaining the Profit at the time of  the advance, and advancing the difference” 12 is Discount. 
 
Despite these two ways of  calculations, they are led to the same amount of  profit if  the 
interest/discount rate are the same, the former one is containing the expectation of  profit 
increased in the instruments which the instruments itself  is treated as a commodity to 
generate or increase the total wealth of  the economy and the later one is more like, 
MacLeod noted that, it is mere cost paid to the bank to get the money paid in advanced at 
the beginning, which can be regarded as using of  credit. However, it is widely applied to 
to the short-term usage of  credit commonly called money market.  
 
To further such distinctions of  pricing logics, the types of  ownership, incorporated in these 
instruments, are different. For a money market instrument, the ownership is of  a short-
term debt, which contained a promise of  passing future legal control of  money inflows, 
from the seller to the buyer, through a payment made by the debtors. It is a title to a future 
money inflows derived from credit which is an incorporeal property13. Hence, the money 
market is for the exchange of  ownership of  debts14 instead of  the exchange of  money15. 
For a capital market instrument, the ownership is of  the commodity or a promise acting 
as a commodity with the output generated from it. It is an exchange of  the future legal 
control of  physical things for the future money inflows. It is also a title to future money 
inflows derived from the future profits (for securities is interests)16 which is an intangible 
property.  
 
Moreover, following the aforementioned logic of  deduction, the notions of  commodity 
tickets and price tickets can be applied to the category of  money market and capital market 
instruments which constructed two types of  the system of  business.  
 
Commodity tickets are “a title to the ownership of  corporeal property” with the real value 
                                                
10 The detail discussion of  the definition of  price can be founded at Fetter and Hadley’s works. See: Frank A Fetter, 
‘The Definition of Price’ (1912) 2 Am Econ Rev 783. See also: Arthur Twining Hadley, Economics: An Account of the 
Relations between Private Property and Public Welfare (GP Putnam’s sons 1896) 70,72. 
11 Henry Dunning. Macleod, The Theory and Practice of Banking (5th Edition, Longmans, Green 1892) 372. 
12 ibid. 
13 The reason why debt or credit as an incorporeal property will be discussed in the section 3.1 
14 Here debt as aforementioned is short-term debt. 
15 This is also one critique made by John Commons that the analogy of  naming “money market” by MacLeod cause the 
confusion of  understanding, which Commons called as “talking metaphor” rather than scientific reasoning. See: John R 
Commons, Institutional Economics Volume 1 (New edition edition, Transaction Publishers 1989) 428. 
16 Future profits or interest in securities is a intangible property rather than a incorporeal property since it is more like 
a future purchasing power. Both credit and interests are the expectation future money inflows. Further discussion will 
be made at Section 3.1 
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which has been assigned to the commodities or labour17. The commodity tickets are a 
recording ticket which is a title to the ownership to avoid passing the physical delivery of  
ownership. The acquisition of  title without the physical delivery facilitated by the legal 
relation of  bailment. the bailment enabled the seller to promise to deliver the value of  the 
things rather than the physical delivery of  the thing. Such development made the modern 
form of  the commodity features possible within the legal infrastructure that the 
commodities with its very nature form acting as speculative futures. However, it seems that 
the commodity tickets merely have little relevance with the securities like bond, shares etc. 
The introduction of  the assignability18 finally extend the scope of  the commodity tickets 
from the tangible property to incorporeal and intangible properties like bonds and shares. 
The bearer form of  the securities can be a good example that the title to the underlying 
property transfer and delivered via the handing over of  the certificate which incorporated 
in such certificate as commodity tickets. Since it is the evidence of  transfer of  legal title, 
the commodity tickets are, authorized by the government and recognized by courts, to be 
an evidence of  ownership of  certain amount of  commodities regardless of  the value 
changes after the transactions. Notably, the way of  production of  commodity tickets are 
making profits to increasing the total welfare of  the community19. 
 
Price tickets are Negotiable promises of  which nominal value expressed in price of  the 
tickets20. Those promises to pay are used to facilitate the circulation of  money in money 
market, as well as the commodity (especially capital) market, through the depositing and 
discounting, borrowing and lending promises to pay the prices of  either commodities and 
promises acting as commodities in lawful money in 24 hours and up to 180 days.  
 
At the beginning, the price tickets also benefited from the notion of  bailment to clarifying 
the relationship between the goldsmith (acting as warehouse) and their depositors, the 
invention of  the goldsmith converted such relation of  bailment into a debt relation that 
the depositors became the creditors of  the goldsmiths instead of  the legal owner of  the 
bullions. Although the common law court prudently refused to recognized such merchant 
customs at the beginning21, this innovative development transferred money from the coins 
and bullions to bank credit. Such transformation made money to be an incorporeal 
property as banker’s demand-promise and an intangible property as the exchange value22 
of  such promise at the market. Hence, the price tickets as negotiable promises to be more 
like money obtained in exchange and it is not a specific thing but the purchasing power to 
obtain anything. Notably, the way of  production of  price tickets are not increasing the real 
wealth of  the community but a promise to increase23.  
 
                                                
17 Commons, Legal foundations of capitalism (n 1) 256. 
18 Assignability, included the form of  negotiability which is the most complete form of  the assignability, will be further 
discussed in next section. 
19 Commons, Legal foundations of capitalism (n 1) 255. 
20 ibid. 
21 ‘Buller v Crips (1703) 6 Mod Rep 29, 87 ER 793’ [1703] Engl Rep. 
22 The notion of  exchange value is critically vital in the development of  modern capitalism, which has been detailed 
discussed in section 3.3. 
23 In this case, the price tickets can be used either in a good way that stimulating the real increasing of  the total wealth 
or in a bad way that the increasing the bubble of  the real economy. 
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2.2 Property in Social Context: A Premise to Analysis 
Scarcity is treated as a social phenomenon instead of  natural fact given that the acquirable 
recourses are limited and the demands of  human being are infinite. Such scarcity can be 
indicated while people attempted to make incompatible resources in their own possession. 
In this case, a man will influence others who also tried to made their own possession. From 
the economists’ perspective, the modern property right is exclusive rights indicated “the 
relationship of  one person to another with the respect to a resource or any line of  action”24. Such 
definition reflects that property right is a means, through which the society can control 
and coordinate the interdependency of  the persons. This is also the rationale to explain 
why the property is a social institution25. Although there is no clear and complete definition 
of  institution26, the institution can be simply defined as a sets of  relationships constrained 
by orders among the people and it is also in charge of  collective action, freedom and 
expanded to the individual action27.  
 
With the modern notion of  property rights, the property constructs the opportunity sets 
of  people through the formal institutions includes the law of  property & law of  contract 
in all common law, law of  equity and statutes law, as well as the informal institutions like 
informal practice and culture traditions. With the notion of  opportunity sets, the 
ownership is entitled a person to create cost for anyone else through the influence of  his 
action and to create benefits for himself  though use or exchange, which means it is an 
absolute right against world without any formal consent of  anyone else to act such rights. 
 
The creation of  any social institution depends on the public and ethical choice28, the 
property as a social institution, its absolute rights against the whole world is sourced from 
the consensus made by the public29. In this case, the common law is a good judge and 
indicator of  the public will to a certain matter, which is also the method of  this paper to 
investigate the extended scope of  property as well as the origin and development of  
property right in securities. The development of  legal infrastructure to facilitate and 
recognize the customs of  businessman will be a good measurement. 
 
As indicated at section 2.1, the nature of  securities is a promise whether it is attached to 
any physical things or not. However, under the context of  medieval common law, the 
primitive notion of  property was limited the common law justice to recognize such 
extension of  the scope of  property. The attempt of  businessman customs to the extension 
of  the scope of  property into two stages. Firstly, extending the scope of  property from 
tangible property to the incorporeal property, which is attached to the tangible things 
                                                
24 Alfred Allan Schmid, Property, Power, and Public Choice: An Inquiry into Law and Economics (A Allan Schmid 1987) 5. 
25 For detail proof  see: A Irving Hallowell, ‘The Nature and Function of Property as a Social Institution’ (1942) 1 J Leg 
Pol Soc 115. 
26 Schmid (n 23) 5. 
27 John R Commons and Kenneth H Parsons, The Economics of Collective Action. (Macmillan 1950) 21. 
28 Schmid (n 23) 24. 
29 In Taylor’s expression: “Property is a public fact or it is no fact at all.” See: John Francis Adams Taylor, ‘The Masks 
of Society an Inquiry Into the Covenants of Civilization’ [1966] 109. 
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through the enforcement of  contract30. The enforcement of  contract from the legal aspect 
is a chose in action. Second stage is from the incorporeal property to the intangible property 
through the creation of  transferability of  the contract 31(or chose in action). Since the 
essences of  the property required both enforceability and alienability of  things, the 
research will be conducted in the development pf  enforceability and alienability of  the 
securities together with its original forms: promise in next section. 
  
                                                
30 John R Commons, ‘Law and Economics’ (1924) 34 Yale LJ 371, 373. 
31 ibid 378. 
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3.  Development of Legal Infrastructure: From Medieval 
Times to 1960s 
3.1 Enforcement of  Contract: Law of  Encumbrance and Chose of  Action. 
In the matter of  enforcement of  a contract, the investigation can be drawn from both 
promisor’s perspective and promisee’s perspective. For a promisor, once the promise has 
been made, he lost his freedom of  choice in this particular issue of  behaviour. In other 
words, the promiser is bounded by a duty or encumbrance of  forbearance, avoidance or 
performance of  his promise. The law of  encumbrance is about obedience and command, 
which implicate the juristic or legal relation of  promisor of  his duty to the promisee. This 
juristic or legal relation are sanctioned and facilitated by either legal penalties or reward. 
The promisees can be the beneficiaries in their rights to request a mandatory acts of  
promisor. The businessman’s custom of  incorporeal property was based on the promise. 
Therefore, the law of  incorporeal property is also a matter of  law of  encumbrance. Since 
the incorporeal property is always the matter of  paying back the debt, it is a matter of  
specific case of  law of  encumbrance that only positive encumbrance has been made in 
that case where the duty of  performance is mandatory to the promisor. Hence, the 
development of  legal infrastructure of  law of  positive encumbrance is pivotal for the 
promisors.  
 
On one hand, the law of  positive encumbrance was a matter of  law of  labour encumbrance 
which historically defined the the law of  master and servant, owner and slave, landlord and 
serf, principal and agent, employee and employer and the husband and wife, all of  which 
is the civil relationship32 derived from a very primitive notion of  physical things33 to the 
ownership of  invisible encumbrance. On the other hand, the law of  investment 
encumbrance also indicated the same changes from the relationship of  landlord and tenant 
to the creditor and debtor. 
 
The implication of  such development on the investment activities are he formal investor’s 
bargain of  selling present purchasing power for the future one. This is what happened in 
early modern business including the notion of  bond, shares, bills of  exchange and 
promissory notes.  
 
Thus, the essential for the promisee in the transactions are selling the present purchasing 
power, accepting and recognizing an expectation or promise of  future purchasing power. 
The promisee get the promisor’s credit at the cost of  the ownership of  his money. While 
                                                
32 Commons, Legal foundations of capitalism (n 1) 237. 
33 In this case, Slaves and serfs is a physical property. However, the relationship of  husband and wife is a mere personal 
relation unattached to any physical concepts. Thus, the expansion of  such relations shows the development from 
primitive notion of  labour encumbrance attached to things to the mere personal relation. 
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accepting and recognizing the expectation and promise of  future purchasing power, the 
promisee should be granted a right to enforce an action by law which is the legal 
infrastructure to facilitate the contracting activities from the promisee’s perspective.  
 
As the right to action in legal notion is a ‘chose in action’, the enforcement of  contract 
from the promisee’s perspective is a matter about the law of  ‘chose in action’. Although 
the notion of  incorporeal things has been codified and recognized in the Roman Law that 
the incorporeal things cannot be touched and consisting in a right34, those notion of  
incorporeal things needed to be constituted step by step in case law, which shows the  
common recognition as indicated in section 2.2, instead of  being taken for granted since 
there is a huge gap between the roman law and the medieval English common law. Bracton 
firstly indicated the “actiones” from the incorporeal things in 1200s 35  which partly 
adopted the similar legal notion codified by Justine. According to his distinctions, the 
“actiones” like the rents, obligations claims or advowsons, are not completely recognized 
as property for the heir to inherit unless his predecessor put it in court and get a 
judgement36. It is the primitive notion of  the property37 for the medieval common law 
which separated the “actiones” like annuities and corrodies from normal incorporeal 
things into the category of  ‘chose in action’38 which is created by contract in our modern 
law.  
 
It is no doubt that the ‘chose in action’ was merely a right to bring action at the beginning. 
The earliest traceable case in English common law was in Edward III reign, it was firstly 
titiled as “chose qe feaut en accion”39 such right of  action was indicated by Fleta as an 
“actio” which is inalienable together with the “res sacra”, “liber homo”, etc.40 and the 
inalienability of  ‘chose in action’ became a common law principle41. The legal scholar 
Wilkinson has made an insightful definition for the ‘chose in action’ at this time that 
“things in respect of  which a man had no actual possession or enjoyment, but a mere right 
enforceable by action”42 in medieval times. 
                                                
34 Such as an inheritance, an usufruct or obligations contracted in any way. See: Corpus juris civilis. Institutiones. [from 
old catalog and Thomas Collett Sandars, The Institutes of Justinian (London, New York [etc] Longmans, Green, and co 
1922) 103 II.2. 
35 “Incorporales vero res sunt, quae tangi non possunt,…, sicut haereditas, usus fructus, advocationes ecclesiarum, 
obligations et actiones, et hujus modi,…”  See: Henry de Bracton and others, De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliæ Vol.2 
(New Haven, Yale university press; London, H Milford, Oxford university press 1915) 47–48 f.10b. 
36 Two cases are referred by Bracton. See: Henry de Bracton and others, De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliæ Vol.4 (New 
Haven, Yale university press; London, H Milford, Oxford university press 1915) 267–68 f.407b. 
37 This also can be regarded as primitive realism. 
38 William Searle Holdsworth, A History of English Law Book I-V (Methuen 1922) vols 1–5 Book 2, 300-301; Book 3, 
126-127. 
39 Luke Owen Pike Alfred John Horwood, Year Books of the Reign of King Edward the Third (Longman 1896)13 Ed.III. 
40 “Actio autem, res sacra, res coronae, liber homo,…et portae civitais , a nullo dari debent, ut valida sit donatio.” See: 
John Selden, Fleta, seu Commentarius juris Anglicani sic nuncupatus, sub Edwardo rege primo, seu circa annos abhinc 340. ab anonymo 
conscriptus, ... , nunc primum typis editus. Accedit tractatulus vetus de agendi excipiendique formulis Gallicanus, Fet Assavoir dictus. 
Subjungitur etiam Joan. Seldeni ad Fletam dissertatio historica (typis SR 1685) Vol.6, 6,§ 2. 
41 The inalienability of  chose in action was iterated in the case of  federal lord over a villein that “Item dit fuit, que ceo 
que est en possession de villein come rent grante al villein de que il est seisi, le Seigniore puit happer, mes ceo que demur 
en accion al villein le Seignior n’avera pas. Come si obligation de dette soit fait al villein, ou covenant ou garrantie fait au 
villein, de ceo le Seignior n’avera nul avantage.” Brooke also call the ‘chose in action’ as ‘chose en action & chose en 
suspence’ See: Robert Brooke and England and Wales., La Graunde Abridgement, Collect & escrie per le Iudge 
tresreuerend Syr Robert Brooke, Chiualier ... (R Tottyl 1576) Chose in Action, pl.8 . 
42 Harold William Wilkinson, Personal Property. (17th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell 1971) 29. 
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It is necessary to make a division of  ‘chose in action’ into ‘chose in action personal’ and 
‘chose in action real’ relying on the law of  procedure within the sphere of  medieval 
common law43. Since the historical development of  ‘chose in action’ are merged the notion 
from ‘chose in action personal’ and ‘chose in action real’ respectively, the examination will 
be conducted case by case to discover the formation of  general notion of  ‘chose in action’. 
 
The ‘chose in action personal’ is mere rights arising from the personal actions. The English 
Medieval common law44 didn't fully accepted the concept that personal actions, derived 
upon the the notion of  ‘obligatio’, may arise out of  the contract or tort, a Roman law 
notion indicated by Bracton45, since many of  the personal actions can not be put into the 
category set by the Roman law46. However, it is still clear that the personal actions brought 
through a contract or a tort is a personal thing. It derived from the agreement between two 
parties or the defendant’s wrong doing to a plaintiff. Hence, these actions were personal 
matters between two persons and merely these two persons. It is a personal relation. 
 
The ‘chose in action real’ is the rights derived from the real actions that those rights to get 
seisin are enforceable through entry or actions. It is rights of  entry or action for a disseisee 
whose estate has been disseised by disseisor.  
 
Finally, in the case Colonial Bank v. Whitney, the judge gives a comphrehensive definition 
of  ‘chose in action’ that “’chose in action’ is a known legal expression used to describe all 
personal rights of  property which can only be claimed or enforced by action, and not by 
taking physical possession.”47 
 
Both ‘chose in action personal’ and ‘chose in action real’ can be enforced by the action of  
detinue or of  trespass. It should be obviously observed that those enforcements of  
contract and remedy of  tort for a holder of  ‘chose in action’ was still in the sphere of  law 
of  property as a physical thing with the relevant legal actions to recover those tangible 
property or coins not the merely enforcement of  the contract. Meanwhile, those various 
remedies for the forcible detention of  land or other physical chattels like the “writ of  right” 
and “writ of  debt”. The origin of  “writ of  right” as a remedy indicated two important 
facts. Firstly, the complete remedies of  the actions in rem were derived from the this remedy 
that giving the possession instead of  property48. Those derived remedies confirmed the 
absolute right of  the property right against the whole world which can be applied to not 
only physical things but also the paper instruments as evidence of  the ownership. It is vital 
foundation for the various securities appeared in the later time. 
                                                
43 William S Holdsworth, ‘The History of the Treatment of“ Choses” in Action by the Common Law’ (1920) 33 Harv 
Law Rev 997, 1001. 
44 John le Breton and others, Britton : [a treatise on the laws of England] (London : Printed by the assignes of John Moore, 
Esquire 1640) I.29.2. 
45 See Both: Corpus juris civilis Institutiones [from old catalog and Sandars (n 33). And Bracton and others (n 34). 
46 Holdsworth (n 37) vols. 1–5, Book 2, 311-312. 
47  ‘THE COLONIAL BANK APPELLANTS; AND FREDERICK WHINNEY RESPONDENT. - (1886) 11 
App.Cas. 426’ [1886] ICLR Appeal Cases. 
48 Frederic William Maitland Frederick Pollock, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I. (The University 
press 1898) vol Vol.2, 78. 
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The significance of  “writ of  debt” is the legal recognition of  paying back certain amount 
of  debt instead of  the restore particular coins lent49, which indicated the fungibility of  the 
contractual obligation. However, the “writ of  debt” still failed to enforce the mere promise, 
but the bond which is the sealed evidence of  the debt not the debtor’s promise50. 
 
The modern formation of  the simple or parol contract together with the written or 
unwritten promise needed a transition from the recovery from trespass of  either physical 
damage to the assumpsit as a remedy to the breaches of  contract. The ‘writ of  assumpsit’ 
51consists of  two forms52: (1) the special assumpsit where a promise has been expressed or 
implied53.  (2) indebitatus assumpsit which derived from the past debt54. This is the 
completion of  establishment of  modern form of  contract including the enforcement of  
the promise to facilitate and recognize the businessman’s custom by improvement the legal 
infrastructure as well as the promise as ‘chose in action’. 
 
3.2 Alienability of  the ‘Chose in action’: Legal Barrier and Significance 
3.2.1 Inalienability of  the ‘chose in action’: Medieval Legal Tradition and Legal Procedure  
Before discussing the development of  recognition of  assignability of  ‘chose in action’, it 
is better to clarify the reason of  inalienability of  the ‘chose in action’ from the medieval 
primitive sense. 
 
There are mainly two reasons for the medieval common law to recognize the alienability 
of  the ‘chose in action’ from the path dependency perspective. 
 
The first barrier is the notion of  property as tangible things. The notion of  tangible things 
is original from the man’s copping with the physical nature and possessing it. Therefore, 
the primitive common law tradition could not ideate the notion of  property without the 
physical possession. As mentioned in section 2.2, the notion of  property is a intangible 
relation relying on the recognition of  the general public55 and the promise from the 
authorities56, a person can regard his right as incorporeal property which has been proved 
                                                
49 Edward Jenks, A Short History of English Law: From the Earliest Times to the End of the Year 1911 (Little, Brown 1913) 57–
59. 
50 ibid 135,136,510. 
51 For detail of  the history of  assumpsit see: James Barr Ames, ‘The History of Assumpsit. I. Express Assumpsit’ [1888] 
Harv Law Rev 1. & James Barr Ames, ‘The History of Assumpsit. II. Implied Assumpsit’ [1888] Harv Law Rev 53. 
52 Lord Chancellor Mackay of Clashfern and Martha Spurrier of Middle Temple, Halsbury’s Laws of England (LexisNexis 
2008) vrs 404. Writ of assumpsit. 
53 It is firstly indicated in the case Andrew v Boughey (1552) that the plea mentioned the concept of  promise been made 
by using the example of  horse. See ‘Andrew v Boughey in B. R. (1552) 73 ER 160’ [1552] Engl Rep, 160–62 note 23. 
54 Slade’s case (1602) indicated that : “An action on the case of  an indebitatus assumpsit lies well; for every debt implies 
a promise, and is a good consideration in facto to found an action upon. But for a debt by simple contract due by testator 
no assumpsit lies against the executors.” See: ‘Slade’s Case (1602) 4 Co Rep 91a, Moore KB 667’ [1602] Engl Rep. 
55 The common law court recognition. 
56 The statutes law legislation. 
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in section 3.1. However, the physical possession means man’s physical control over things 
that the incorporeal property can not be possessed from this primitive perspective. The 
invention of  ‘writ in debt’ promoted the physical handling of  the symbolized physical 
objects as the representative of  the things which cannot be physical handled. Hence, the 
invention of  paper instrument as the evidence of  the title facilitated the ‘chose in action’ 
is a compromise to fulfil the requirement of  the law of  possession to overcome the barrier 
set by the primitive notion of  possession of  tangible property57. 
 
The second barrier is the primitive notion of  promises or derived ‘chose in action personal’ 
as personal relation. Either implied or express promise are the foundations of  the society. 
Many scholars developed their researches from the premise that the society generated from 
the contract of  its participants. Such social contract was not completed at the beginning 
and waiting for the afterwards interpretations by forthcoming participants. It is like Greer 
stated that “custom that writes out slowly from generation to generation the term of  the 
social compact.”58 If  an individual has entered in a collective community, he made an 
implied promise that he wouldn't violate the custom in this community. At an early stage 
of  the primitive society, if  a man has violated his express or implied promise (violation of  
law), there will be an enforced collective responsibility to the members of  the same group 
and children of  wrongdoer. It is the root of  blood feud, hereditary serfdom and the 
primitive communism along with the primitive notion of  collective responsibility59.  
 
The recognition of  the promises between two equal persons depending on the legal 
recognition of  the equal and liberty of  contracting/promising and the individual’s 
responsibility to the promise. Such recognition means the enforcement of  the authorities 
will not have the binding power to order the successors of  whom made the promise nor 
the successor of  whom benefited from such promise. Hence, the inalienability of  the 
promises and its consequences end the blood feud or hereditary personal relations 
constitutes the slavery and serfdom. the evolution of  the law of  equality and liberty of  
individuals, which is also the law of  inalienability and non-survivorship of  rights (including 
the chose in action), from the primitive law which allowed such things is the merit of  the 
notion of  equality and social justice60. In the case of The Marquis of  Winchester , the merit 
of  the development was iterated by excluding the mere right of  action out the the scope 
of  hereditament61. We shall observe such barrier is not set for ‘chose in action’ but for the 
purpose of  social justice62. Hence, the possible way of  alienability of  the ‘chose in action’ 
                                                
57 The legal tradition of  realism in the law of  possession still affects the modern time legal infrastructure. One of  the 
example in this issue is occurred in the dematerialization of  the bearer securities which will be mainly discussed in section 
4. 
58 FA Greer, ‘Custom in the Common Law’ (1893) 9 LQ Rev 153. 
59 Commons, Legal foundations of capitalism (n 1) 249. 
60 In the Lampet’s case, the judege said “It was observed the great wisdom and policy f  the sages and founders of  our 
law, who have provided that no possibilities, right, title nor thing in action, shall be granted or assigned to strangers, for 
that would be the occation of  multiplying of  contentions and suits, of  great oppression of  people, and chiefly of  
terre-tenants, and the subversion of  the de and equal execution of  justice.” See: (1603) 10 Rep. 48a Reprinted at John 
Farquhar Fraser John Henry Thomas, The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, Knt.: In Thirteen Parts (J Butterworth and Son 1826) 
328-341. 
61 The Attorney mentioned that “for it would be vert vexatious and inconvenient that the estates of  purchasers and 
others, after many descents and long possession, would be impeached at the king’s suit, by such general words, against 
the reason and rule of  common law.” See: ‘The Marquis of Winchester’s Case - (1638) 79 ER 1035’ [1638] Engl Rep. 
62 The case of  Bishop of  Lincoln v. Wolferstan indicated such tradition that the banning of  the granting an advowson is for 
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is to respect such historical root first.  
 
From the procedure of  the law perspective, the issues of  maintenance and champerty were 
the two major concerns for preventing the ‘chose in action’ from the assignment. The legal 
interpretation of  the assignment of  ‘chose in action’ for the assignee is merely the 
entitlement to sue in the assignor’s name in the medieval common law context63. On the 
issue of  champerty64, the concern of  the assignability of  the ‘chose in action’ that the 
‘chose in action’ has been assigned to a person, who has power to influence the impartiality 
of  the judgement or any illegitimate pressure to the disseisor. The late Roman law has the 
same legal tradition but different treatment to the concern of  the champerty. In the late 
Roman law, the assignment of  ‘chose in action’ was permitted but it is prohibited that the 
assignment took place while the assignee was more powerful than the assigner65.Till the 
modern era, the common law lawyer still prudently treated the free assignment of  the 
‘chose in action’ from this perspective66.  
 
On the issue of  maintenance67, it was firstly distinguished as ‘maintenance in the country’. 
The offence so called manutentio ruralis has the same legal origin with champerty68. After  
hundred years practice, the stat.32 Hen.VIII.c.969 reiterated the inconveniences coming 
from the maintenance, ‘buying of  title’ and ‘pretenced titles70’. It admitted and enacted that 
all the previous law against the maintenance, champerty and embracery should stay in force 
and in execution. Moreover, it strictly prohibited that no one should buy, sell or exchange 
any pretenced rights or titles in lands and treatments71， which made the person can not 
sell the things he didn't own72.Notably, the construction of  stat. 32 Hen.VIII.c.9 was 
facilitated by the case Partridge v. Strange73. 
                                                
the public utility not because of  it being ‘chose in action’. See: ‘Bishop of Lincoln and Whitehead v Wolferstan - (1764) 96 ER 
284’ [1764] Engl Rep. 
63 Sir Frederick Pollock and Sir Percy Henry Winfield, Principles of Contract (Stevens 1950) 701. 
64 Champerty has put into statutes law as a criminal offence in 3 Ed.I, cc.25 See: John Reeves, History of the English Law : 
From the Time of the Saxons, to the End of the Reign of Philip and Mary [1558] (London : printed for Reed and Hunter 1814) 
vol II. 
65 Theodosius and others, Code Théodosien I-XV, code Justinien, constitutions Sirmondiennes (Les Éditions du Cerf 2009)4.35.22. 
66 In the case Defries v. Miline (1913), Farwell, L.J., stated that “I think it would be exceedingly bad policy to allow a person 
to sell rights of  action for tort which he did not care to rub the risk of  enforcing himself; as for example to allow a 
liquidator to put such rights up for auction and sell them to some one who might buy for a small sum of  money the 
chance of  recovering a larger sum or possibly of  blackmailing.” See: DEFRIES v MILNE [1912 D 109] - [1913] 1 Ch 
98 ICLR: Chancery Division (us COURT OF APPEAL 1912).110-111 
67 Brook pointed out “Et sic vide que chose in action poet ester assigne oustre pur loyal cause, come iust det, mez nemy 
pur maintenance.” See: Brooke and England and Wales (n 40)140 b. 
68 Edward Coke and others, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, Or, A Commentary upon Littleton : Not the 
Name of the Author Only, but of the Law Itself (Philadelphia : Robert H Small 1853) vol II, 368 b. 
69 John Reeves, History of the English Law : From the Time of the Saxons, to the End of the Reign of Philip and Mary [1558] 
(London : printed for Reed and Hunter 1814) vol IV, 219. 
70 pretenced title means the pretenced rights of  persons not being in possession. 
71 Reeves (n 67) 291. 
72 The statutes pointed out “if  any such bargain, sale, promise, covenant, or grant, be made, and the seller has not 
himself  nor his ancestors been in possession of  the same, or of  the reversion or remainder, or taken the rents or profits, 
for one whole year next before sale, …, and half  to the person who sues for it. ” See: ibid. 
73 ‘Partridge v Strange and Others (1552) 73 ER 159’ [1552] Engl Rep. 
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3.2.2 Assignment of  Securities as ‘chose in action’ 
The investigation of  the assignability of  ‘chose in action’ can be mainly divided into two 
parts. The first part is the growth trend of  assignability based on the original notion of  
‘chose in action’ since medieval common law. The second part is the evolution of  the 
notion ‘chose in action’ since early 16th century and the recognition of  various financial 
innovations as ‘chose in action’ together with its assignability. 
 
The assignment of  the ‘chose in action real’ as mere rights to action firstly arose from the 
union of  marriage. In the case of  Powes v. Marshall, the judges, Twisden and Windham, held 
the opinion that the husband can take the proprietary action of  detinue alone for things 
that his wife owned before the marriage, and as such action was relied on law of  tort to 
convert things, both husband and wife should join in suits if  there was an action of  trover74. 
The idea behind this case, as the starting point of  the proprietary aspect75 of  the action 
of  trover, was further developed by the judge Hyde and Keeling in the case Blackborn v. 
Greaves that such action can be brought by either of  the spouse which is a dissent from the 
Twisdon and Windham. When the Lord Coke and his colleagues at his time thought the 
assignment of  any ‘chose in action real’ was ‘repugnant to every honest feeling of  the 
human heart’76 from the ground against ‘maintenance in the country’ for over 200 years 
against the privilege of  the federal lords and the great landowners. Those opposites from 
the maintenance became hardly found in 17th century due to the decline of  the feudalism 
and the decay of  power those landowners diminuted the importance of  the concern of  
maintenance, which fully disappeared in 18th century77. 
 
Moreover, it is indicated by Brooke that the assignment of  ‘chose in action real’ like the 
rights of  entry or other proprietary actions had more constrains than the ‘chose in action’ 
personal78. The assignment of  the possibility in equity hadn’t been recognized until 171979. 
However, the case Thomas v. Freeman80 was the first case to question the sufficiency of  the 
aforementioned arguments against the inalienability of  the ‘ chose in action’ on the basis 
of  maintenance and evolution that brought the law of  equity into consideration which also 
facilitated the evolution of  the notion of  ‘chose in action’ in second part of  this section.  
 
Comparing with the common law’s punishment after the actions from the law of  
procedure’s respective, the procedure of  law of  equity can conduct before the action. The 
intervention is needed from the equity courts’ injunction, otherwise the extension from 
the common law courts will be needed by their writs of  mandamus and prohibition. 
Combined these two legal systems, the modern transition of  from the tangible properties 
                                                
74 ‘Powes & Uxor v. Marshall. - [1662] Sid. 172/82 E.R. 1038’ [1662] Sderfins Kings Bench Div. 
75 This proprietary aspect of  ‘chose in action ’ strengthened the old view of  ‘chose in action real’ in the later development.  
76 ‘Master v Miller - (1792) 145 ER 855’ [1792] Engl Rep. 
77 ‘Hunt v Bishop (1853) 22 LJ Ex 337, 8 Exch 675’ [1853]. & Great Britain. and Commissioners Appointed to Inquire 
into the Law of England Respecting Real Property., Third Report Made to His Majesty by the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire 
into the Law of England Respecing Real Property. ([House of Commons?] 1833) 69.  
78 Brooke and England and Wales (n 40) 305. 
79 ‘Wind v Jekyl and Aleone - (1719) 24 ER 522’ [1719] Engl Rep. 
80 ‘Thomas v Freeman - (1706) 23 ER 967’ [1706] Engl Rep. 
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to incorporeal and intangible properties has been realized81 and the new rights can be 
quickly recognized and protections over new definition of  properties can be achieved 
through the injunctions from the equity courts82. The law of  equity deals more efficiently 
with on the intangible value by directly issuing its command which creating uses and trusts 
in the modern capitalism.  
 
Therefore, the complete liberation of  the modern notion of  assignability of  the ‘chose in 
action real’ wasn't realized until the late 19th century. The alienation of  the right of  the 
owner, who is out of  the possession of  his property (de facto ‘chose in action real’), has 
been preinstalled in the case of  Cohen v. Mitchell 83 and finally recognized in Dawson v. Great 
Northern and City Railway84 by referring the case of  Dickinson v. Burrell85. 
 
On the case of  ‘chose in action personal’, firstly, it is always an issue related to the personal 
nature which constituted the rationale for the early common law’s prohibition of  its 
assignment. To better investigate assignment of  these contractual rights, the recognition 
of  transfer of  the debt can be regarded as the recognition of  assignability of  the 
contractual rights (‘chose in action personal’)86. The earliest attempt of  the merchant to 
bypass the prohibition set by the common law to assign their debt was achieved by the 
assignor A should appoint the assignee B as his attorney to sue for that amount of  debt 
and they would stipulate that the assignee B would keep that amount of  money after the 
suit87, if  the right to ascertain a money has been assigned from A to B. This method has 
been recognized as merchant custom in the 15th century as de facto assignment of  debt by 
the common law court88. With the trend of  reinforcing the maintenance89, the common 
law court prudentially gave chose in action with a conditional alienability that the assignee 
and the assignor should show some common interest to avoid that assignment being 
attacked on the ground of  maintenance90. Two controversial reports of  the same case of  
Penson v. Hickbed are good examples to show the opposite opinions within the common 
law Justices on the issue of  free assignment of  the debt. The Justice of  the case held the 
                                                
81 Commons, Legal foundations of capitalism (n 1) 234. 
82 George Tucker Bispham and Joseph D.. McCoy, The Principles of Equity (8th edn, Banks law publishing 1909) 9. 
83 ‘COHEN v. MITCHELL. - (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 262’ [1890] ICLR KingsQueens Bench Div. 
84 ‘DAWSON v. GREAT NORTHERN AND CITY RAILWAY COMPANY. - [1905] 1 K.B. 260’ [1904] ICLR 
KingsQueens Bench Div. 
85 The Dawson’s Case referred the case of  Dickinson v. Burrell as “an assignment of  property is valid, even although that 
property may be incapable of  been recovered with one litigation and the equitable interest in the case shall be recognized.” 
The custom of  the conveyance of  ‘chose in action real’ has been recognized and codified by Judicature Act 1873 c.66. 
s.25. (this act has recognized assignability of  the chose in action which will further discussed in later part of  this section). 
See: ‘DICKINSON v. BURRELL. - (1866) L.R. 1 Eq. 337’ [1866] ICLR Equity Cases. & ‘[R]Supreme Court of Judicature 
Act 1873 (1873 c 66)’ [no date] UK Parliam Acts s.25. 
86 In the case of  Gerard v. Lewis, Willes indicated “the rule against assigning a ‘chose in action’ stood in the way of  an 
actual transfer of  the debt.” See: ‘GERARD v. LEWIS. - (1867) L.R. 2 C.P. 305’ [1867] ICLR Common Pleas. 
87 Prisot, C, J pointed out that “Si on soit ebdette a moy et livre a moy un obligation en satisfaction de cest det, en que 
un auter est tenu a luy, jeo suirai action en le nom cesty que fuit endette a moy.” See: Great Britain and Robert Brooke 
(eds), Les Reports Des Cases En Les Ans Des Roys Edward V., Richard III., Henrie VII., & Henrie VIII: Touts Qui Par Cy Devant 
Ont Este Publies... Qui Referrent Les Cases a L’abbregement de Brook (Printed by George Sawbridge, William Rawlins, and 
Samuel Roycroft, assigns of Richard and Edward Atkins 1679) Y. B. 15 Hen. VII, HIl., pl.3. 
88 Ames said in Disseisin of  Chattels that “in this way the practical advantage of  a transfer was secured without any 
sacrifice of  the principle of  the inalienability of  ‘chose in action’.” See: James Fitzjames Stephen and others, Select Essays 
in Anglo-American Legal History (Boston : Little 1907) vol III, 584 (inl. n.2). 
89 Supra note 67. 
90 See: Charles Harold Williams and Selden Society (eds), Year Books of Henry VI. 1 Henry VI, A.D. 1422 (The publications 
of the Selden Society v. 50, Quaritch 1933) Y. B. 34 Hen. MIch., pl. 15. & Supra note. 87. 
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opinion that any assignment of  debt together with the letter to entitle assignee the power 
acting as attorney to sue it would be void only in the case of  champerty. There are two 
causes to allege the reason for bad consideration. The Justice held that the consideration 
was not well alleged for the first cause91. The Justice didn't think the buying of  bills is 
maintenance92. However, the Justice Leo had the different opinion on the first cause. He 
held the opinion that the first cause was valid93. Meanwhile, he also admitted that there was 
a rule to enable the assignee sue in the assignor’s name94 that the debt should be assigned 
to meet the lawful causes like by the way of  satisfaction, which also indicated in the South 
and Marsh’s case95 in the same year. Hence the completion of  the conditional assignment 
of  the ‘chose in action personal’ has been finished in the reign of  Elizabeth I.  
 
According to the aforementioned development, we shall still be aware that the assignment 
of  the chose in action personal or any other contractual rights, which are the the promises 
or contracts made by two equal and free parties voluntarily96, are void without opposite 
party’s consent to such assignment. Once the relation is still the personal relation arising 
from the personal confidence rather than a property relation originated from transfer of  
physical things or evidence, the argument for the inalienability of  such ‘chose in action 
personal’ will still be valid under the norm of  common law. Hence, rather than struggling 
to make full assignability of  the ‘chose in action’ under the common law, the circumvent 
of  borrowing the new notion of  property from the law of  equity will be more efficient. 
From the law of  equity, the property is more like a real right against the world instead of  
the common law’s notion. The circumvent of  the legal practice is making some contractual 
rights97 into property rather than making all ‘ chose in action’ assignable.  
 
The start of  the trend was indicated by the case of  Warmstrey v. Tanfield in 162898 which 
recognized the assignment of  the future possibility under a trust relationship in equity99 
and highlighted the creation of  the notion of  equitable assignment of  the legal ‘chose in 
action’. This is the admission of  the validity of  assignment of  chose in action under equity 
without showing the special relation between the assignee and assignor as Judicature Act 
1873 stated100. Moreover, such assignment can be completed in two ways. Firstly, the 
assignment can be conducted by the way of  contract which two parties’ valuable 
                                                
91 The First cause is “it is not alledeged for what the money contained in the bills was due, nor two whom; and it may 
be they were bills made to the defendant himself, or due to him, and so no consideration.” See: ‘Penson v Hickbed (1589) 
78 ER 427 Cro.Eliza. 170’ [1589] Case Overv32 ELIZ. Hil. 427. 
92 The justice’s arguments are “for it is usual among merchants to make exchange of  money of  bills of  debt, et e contra. 
And Gadwy said it is not maintenance to assign a debt with a letter of  attorney to sue for it, except it be assigned to be 
recovered, and the party to have part of  it.” Ibid. 
93 In Leo’s comment, such assignment was bad since there was no signal that any debt was due. See: ‘Penson v Hickbed 
(1589) 78 ER 427 4. Leo. 99’ [1589] Case Overv. 
94 It was de facto the assignment of  the chose in action personal. 
95 ‘South and Marsh’s Case - (1589) 74 ER 654’ [1589] Engl Rep. 
96 Supra, note 60 
97 Since the notion of  ‘chose in action’ may changed through the development of  legal infrastructure. Here using the 
contractual right to distinguishing with the modern notion of  ‘chose in action’. 
98 ‘Warmstrey v Tanfield (1628) 1 Eq Cas Abr 46, 1 Rep Ch 29’ [1628] Court Chancery Rep. 
99 This revolutionary case has shaken norm set by the common law that the trust (chose in action) can not be assigned. 
The Coke’s commentary summarized as “… had a trust, yet could not be assigned the same over the plaintiff, because it 
was a matter in privity between them, and was in nature of  a chose in action.” See: Sir Edward Coke, The Fourth Part of 
the Institutes of the Laws of England: Concerning the Jurisdiction of Courts (E and R Brooke 1797) Cap.8 85. 
100 ‘[R]Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 (1873 c 66)’ (n 83) s.25 (6). 
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consideration is needed to enable the contract to be enforced 101 . Therefore, the 
enforcement of  a contract is a premise for the assignment of  ‘chose in action’102. Another 
ways of  enable such assignment without any valuable consideration are making the 
assignor as a trustee of  assignee thus the common interest has been involved through a 
trusteeship103. In this case, the problem of  assignability of  the securities will become the 
problem of  the legal identification of  securities as ‘chose in action’. 
 
With aid of  the notion of  ‘writ in debt’, the notion of  ‘chose in action’ has been extended 
from the right to bring action to document of  evidence of  right104. the ‘chose in action’ 
was treated as bona et catalla105 in Calye’s case106. Therefore, various of  financial innovations 
under the modern category of  securities has been regarded as the ‘chose in action through 
the de facto legal recognition by case law and statutes law. The bond was de facto said to 
be a ‘chose in action’ as hereditament107 in 1534108. The charters and evidences relating to 
the freehold or inheritance, obligations109, and other deeds and specialities are categories 
as ‘chose in action’ in 1584110. The Calye’s case made it possible that the various of  
commercial documents from the financial innovations are treated as chose in action since 
late 16th century. In the case of  Master v. Miller, the modern scope of  negotiable 
instruments111 has been treated as ‘chose in action’ in 1792112. The policy of  insurance is 
a ‘chose in action’113 by recognizing the right to receive a sum of  money as ‘chose in action’. 
The bill of  lading was regarded as a chose in action in 1786114.  
 
However, the recognition of  the shares and stocks as ‘chose in action’ and their 
assignability are more complicated compared to other ‘chose in action’. Shares and stocks 
                                                
101 ‘Wright v. Wright 1 Ves. Sen. 409’ (1750) 1 Ves Rep 409, 412. 
102 For the development of  legal infrastructure to enforce a contract, full details can be founded in previous section 3.1. 
103 ‘Wright v Wright 1 Ves Sen 409’ (n 99). 
104 Supra, note 46. 
105 In English legal terminology, “goods and chattels” 
106 ‘Calye’s Case - (1583) 77 ER 520’ [1583] Engl Rep. 
107 From the early medieval common law notion of  ‘chose in action’, any ‘chose personal’ as hereditament were taken 
away from the category of  ‘chose in action’.  See: Supra, note 37. Therefore, it can be a proof  as the aforementioned 
evolution of  ‘chose in action’ in the development of  legal infrastructure. 
108 In the case of  Knolle’s case, a series of  rendering rent had been devised to a stranger and the Chief  Justice Baldwin 
recognized that the stranger’s heir or executors had the right to have theses rents. Hence, the series of  expectable future 
cash flow from the land rent can be de facto regarded as a bond and the devise and inheritance of  the bond differed 
from the existing customs that the inalienability of  the debt. The courts finally hold the opinion that the rents were a 
chattel and de facto recognized the bond as a ‘chose in action’ as hereditaments. However, the Chief  Justice at that time 
failed to recur the precedence that the right to a rent was things could be assigned in the reign of  Edward IV. See: ‘Knolles’ 
Case - (1534) 73 ER 13’ [1534] Engl Rep. and N Neilson and Selden Society, Year books of Edward IV. (Quaritch 1931) 
84. 
109 The case Chanel v. Roboham recognized precedent made by Calye’s Case that the parchment and wax of  a bond was a 
‘chose in action’ as bona et catalla and the statement is quoted as “although it was objected, that the parchment and wax 
are bona & catalla , and may pass by that name; yet for as much as the debt included and wrote upon it is the principal, 
the words of  the grant ought to comprehend the name of  the principal.” See: ‘Chanel v Robotham - (1605) 80 ER 48’ 
[1605] Engl Rep. 
110 The Calye’s case indicated that “although they do not of  their proper nature extend to charter and evidences 
concerning freehold or inheritance, or obligations or other deeds or specialties, being things in action.” See: ‘Calye’s Case 
- (1583) 77 ER 520’ (n 104). 
111 The detail of  the negotiability of  these credit instruments will be discussed in section 3.2.3. 
112 “the bill is evidence of  right of  action.” See: ‘Master v Miller - (1792) 145 ER 855’ (n 74). 
113 The judgement made by Jessel stated that “In my opinion it is clear beyond all argument that a policy of  assurance 
is a ‘thing in action.’” See: ‘Ex Parte IBBETSON. In Re MOORE. - (1878) 8 Ch.D. 519’ [1878] ICLR Chancery Div, 
520. 
114 “…gets one of  them by a legal title from the owner…has a right to the consignment.” See: ‘Caldwell and Others 
against Ball - (1786) 99 ER 1053’ [1786] Engl Rep. 
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came with the notion of  the public fund since 1500s. From 1500s to 1600s, the granting 
annuities from the crown became the vehicle of  funding, which wa either with a certain 
maturity or perpetual, and were guaranteed by the public revenues. It was de facto treated 
as ‘chose in action’ through regarding the stealing of  a series of  shares and stocks a felony 
by terming them as ‘chose in action’ in 1729115. The earliest case law recognizing those 
specific government securities as chose in action was Snellgrove v. Baily in 1744116 and public 
funds has been recognized as ‘chose in action’ through the test of  execution under 
common law by Lord Thurlow117 which also followed by the Lord Blackburn118. Yet the 
problem had aroused from this classification due to the traits of  ‘chose in action’. During 
the development of  ‘chose in action’, the notion of  reduction into possession is an 
important notion by executing the right to get procession of  tangible property or a certain 
amount of  money. Since the share and stocks of  a joint stock company or perpetual public 
fund have no way to be reduced into possession119 unless the governmental authorities 
could like to redeem or repurchase it120. This barrier opposing the shares and stocks as 
‘chose in action’ has been overcame by the legal recognition that the perfection of  
reduction into possession of  shares and stocks is transferring these stocks or shares into 
his name. In the case of  R. v. Capper, the Lord Chief  Baron recognized all shares and 
stocks as ‘chose in action’ by using analogy, which comparing with other recognized ‘chose 
in action’121.  
 
Notably, stocks and shares treated as ‘chose in action’ enabled assignment of  stock and 
shares in equity. However, they are also granted a special treatment to make it not only in 
equity but also under common law court. For example, the assignability of  granting 
annuities by crown was smoothly achieved under a writ of  fieri facias122. The establishment 
of  public fund was authorized by the statute law in William III era and their assignability 
was also granted through a legislation intervention123.Such transaction of  stocks in these 
fund is not only permitted in equity but also recognized by the common law court124. 
                                                
115 Stat.2 Geo.II, c.5 refered by Frederick Pollock and Robert Samuel Wright, An Essay on Possession in the Common Law 
(Oxford : Clarendon Press 1888) 233. 
116 ‘Snellgrove v Baily - (1744) 26 ER 924’ [1744] Engl Rep. 
117 ‘Dundas v Dutens - (1790) 30 ER 109’ [1790] Engl Rep. 
118  ‘THE COLONIAL BANK APPELLANTS; AND FREDERICK WHINNEY RESPONDENT - (1886) 11 
AppCas 426’ (n 47). 
119 A right of  husband to exercise the rights of  his wife in the common law until being abandoned in the modern era.  
120 ‘Wildman v. Wildman (1803) 9 Ves 174, 32 ER 568’ (1803) 9 Engl Rep 174. 
121 “It is thus settled that a bond, and stock have no locality any more than other choses in action, except for the purpose 
of  probate and administration; and therefore as the words here are bona & catalla felonum they do not pass stock, which 
I consider is a chose in action, or in the nature of  a chose in action. ”See: ‘R v Capper, Re Bowler (1817) 5 Price 217, 146 
ER 587’ [1817] English Report. 266. And followed by ‘THE SOCIÉTÉ GÉNÉRALE DE PARIS AND G. 
COLLADON APPELLANTS; AND JANET WALKER AND OTHERS RESPONDENTS. - (1885) 11 App.Cas. 20’ 
[1885] ICLR Appeal Cases. For the recognition of  shares in joint stock company as ‘chose in action’. See: ‘Humble v 
Mitchell (1839) 11 Ad & El 205, 2 Ry & Can Cas 70’ [1839] 208. 
122 ‘Mary York against Twine - (1605) 79 ER 67’ [1605] Engl Rep. 
123 England and Wales. and others, Stat.4 Wil.&M. c.3: An Act for Granting an Aid to Their Majesties of the Sum of Sixteen 
Hundred Fifty One Thousand Seven Hundred and Two Pounds Eighteen Shillings, towards the Carrying on a Vigorous War against 
France. (Printed by Charles Bill, and the executrix of Thomas Newcomb, deceas’d; printers to the King and Queens most 
Excellent Majesties 1692). & 9 Will III c.44 East India Company Act 1697 cited in Great Britain., East India Acts : A 
Collection of Acts of Parliament Dealing with the East India Company, 1692-1747 (1697). 
124 “A transfer of  stock or shares is effected by an assignment by the bolder and an acceptance by the transferee; the 
only function of  the Bank of  England or of  the company is to see that the transfer is properly registered in their books.” 
See: ‘Davis v Bank of England - [1824-34] All ER Rep 630’ [1824] ER Repr.   
In the case of  Bank of  England v. Lunn, the court pointed out that “if  he can, upon his title to the stock, to be applied as 
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In the issue of  joint trading stock company, the situation has been much more complicated. 
Despite they were created by the royal charter or letter patent125 and the transferability of  
their shocks were enabled immediately126. However, such legal intervention were doubtful 
under the common law for almost two centuries 127  till such transaction had been 
recognized by the court in case of  Walburn v. Ingilby in 1833128. 
 
Moreover, the incapability of  the shares and stocks to physical delivery derived from the 
reduction into possession made the shares and stocks into a very special category of  ‘chose 
in action’ which called ‘mere chose in action’129. Due to the special treatment to overcome 
the reduction into possession130 and reputed ownership during the bankruptcy131, the 
shares and stocks were property of  special kind132. The assignment of  the shares and stocks 
needed to inform the company to vest it under the name of  assignee and followed by the 
modern notion of  abstraction and independence of  assignment. It is also indicated why 
the shares and stocks in the modern capital market are in the registered form. 
 
In general, the assignment of  the ‘chose in action’ can not be completed without the 
perfection of  law of  equity to circumvent the constrains set by the common law customs 
and we shall also observe that the assignment of  the ‘chose in action’ is the transfer of  the 
the equitable rights rather than the assignment of  the chose in possession by physical 
delivery133. 
 
3.2.3 Advanced Form of  Alienability: Negotiability of  Securities 
In this section, the legal origin of  the negotiability under the western legal context and the 
legal recognition of  the negotiability in some securities including the legal tender will be 
discussed. Before discussing these two major issues, the distinction between the 
assignability and negotiability will be provided first. 
 
The distinction of  the assignability and negotiability can be indicated by their different 
                                                
the other property, there is no equity.” See: ‘The Governor and Company of the Bank of England v Lunn - (1809) 33 ER 870’ 
[1809] Engl Rep. 
125 “relieving holders of  stocks in the East India Company… , from liability to being made bankrupt as trader.” See: 
England and Wales. and others, Stat. 13&14 Cha.II, c.24: An Act Declaratory Concerning Bankrupts. (Printed by John Bill 
and Christopher Barker 1662).  
126 These stocks are regarded as real estate. See: Stat. 5&6 Will. & M. c.20: Bank of England Act 1694 (UK Parliament 
Act no date) s.33. 
127 Nathaniel Lindley Lindley and Walter B (Walter Barry) Lindley, A Treatise on the Law of Companies, Considered as a Branch 
of the Law of Partnership (London, Sweet and Maxwell, limited 1902) vol I, 3. 
128 ‘Walburn v Ingilby - (1833) 39 ER 604’ [1833] Engl Rep. 
129 ‘Humble v Mitchell (1839) 11 Ad & El 205, 2 Ry & Can Cas 70’ (n 119) 208. 
130 Supra, note 117. 
131 John Greenwood, An Analytical Digest of the Cases Published in the New Series of the Law Journal Reports: And in All the 
Reports of Decisions in the Courts of Common Law and Equity, in the Ecclesiastical and Admiralty Courts, by the House of Lords, the 
Privy Council and Election Committees of the House of Commons, at Nisi Prius, and in the Court of Review in Bankruptcy : From 
Michaelmas Term 1831, to Trinity Term 1835, Inclusive (EB Ince 1838) 75. 
132 “things of  value” See: ‘Tempest and Another v Kilner - (1845) 135 ER 960’ [1845] Engl Rep, 143. 
133 it has been concluded by The Law of  Property Act 1925 that the ‘chose in action’ is a intangible property and its 
assignment can be achieved in equity. See: ‘Law of Property Act 1925 (1925 c 20)’ 1925 UK Parliam Acts s.136. 
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treatment of  a tort suit in a theft case. If  merchant A had been stolen a securities 
instrument by thief  B. The thief  B thereafter sold this securities instruments to merchant 
C who was in good faith. If  such securities instrument is only with assignability rather than 
the negotiability, it is illegal for the thief  B to transfer the full title of  the instrument due 
to the assignment of  such ‘chose in action’ was only transfer the equitable rights and the 
merchant C was liable for the liens upon such securities instrument. However, if  such 
securities instrument is negotiable, the thief  will acquire the unbelievable legal power to 
transfer better title than he owned to merchant C and merchant C can get the complete 
title to such negotiable securities instruments without any obligation to prove such title. 
Moreover, the merchant A’s title has been destroyed when the merchant C acquired such 
title134. In general, the modern notion of  the negotiability contained following three major 
characteristics: (1) the title has been incorporated with the paper document which the 
holder of  the document does not need to prove his title thus the bona fide transferee can 
acquire a good even if  the transferor had defective title or no title. (2) the consideration is 
presumed in the effective transaction. (3) the transfer of  the instruments can be by delivery 
in the bearer form or by endowments and delivery in an order form.135 Moreover, since 
the major negotiable securities appeared from international commercial practice136 in the 
western Europe including the city states of  northern Italy, the investigation of  such legal 
origins will be extended to the legal custom in these area instead of  English law.  
 
Similar to the treatment in aforementioned medieval English common law, the modern 
scope of  the negotiable instrument also firstly been categorized as ‘chose in action’, which 
de facto extended the scope of  property 137 . Meanwhile, the two reasons for non-
transferability of  the ‘chose in action’ in Europe were the prohibition of  representation138 
and the prohibition of  the formal and corporeal transfer of  the ‘chose in action’139. The 
solution to these two barriers are the potential pathway to the development of  negotiability 
in the modern notion of  negotiable instruments. 
 
The earliest traceable solution to the negotiability can be founded in the Lombard legal 
documents140 in early medieval age141. The lawyers of  Lombardy circumvented the existing 
barriers by two sets of  clauses as expedients. The first set of  clauses are aimed to solve the 
difficulties of  representation. The procedure of  such expedient is using conveyances to 
provide enforcement of  a personal right142 through a third person agency on the grantee’s 
behalf  and a document will be produce in which the debtor would make a promise on his 
                                                
134 The distinction has aroused in the case Hall v. Dean on the issue of  money (legal tender) which could be analogized 
to the characteristic of  negotiability in the English common law tradition. See: ‘Hall v Dean (1600) Cro Eliz 841, Owen 
131’ [1600] Ct KB. 
135 WS Holdsworth, ‘Origins and Early History of Negotiable Instruments I’ (1915) 31 LQ Rev 12, 12. 
136 i.e. Bill of  Exchange, promissory note, letter of  exchange and bank note, etc. 
137 Edward Jenks, ‘On the Early History of Negotiable Instruments’ (1893) 9 LQ Rev 70, 76. 
138 Similar to the concern of  champerty.  
139 This is mainly an issue of  symbolization of  ‘chose in action’ by using the paper document as its evidence. 
140 The two available sources for the law of  Lombardy Kingdom are the Memorie e documenti per servire all'istoria del Ducato 
di Lucca and Codex diplomaticus cavensis. See: Memorie e documenti per servire all’istoria del Ducato di Lucca: Memorie e documenti per 
servire all’istoria del ducato di Lucca. 5.2 (Francesco Bertini 1837). And Mauro Schiani Michele Morcaldi, Codex diplomaticus 
cavensis: nunc primum in lucem editus curantibus dd ... (H Hoepli 1877) vol i-x. 
141 From 7th century to 10th century. 
142 Right in personam in Brunner’s description. See: Zeitschrift Fur Das Gesammte Handelsrecht.vol.22 (Levin Goldschmidt 
1877). 
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performance to not only the original creditor but also anyone who produce such 
documents as the creditor’s agency143. Such expedient is achieved by two clauses named by 
Brunner as Exactionsklausel and Stellvertretungsklasel144. The former clauses ensure the right 
of  the grantee will be enforced by a third person agency after the circumstances they 
mentioned in the charter145 and the later clauses ensure such enforcement in another way 
which the performance shall be complied to the creditor146. Second set of  clauses are aimed 
to tackle the issue of  the transfer of  incorporeal rights. The procedure of  such expedient 
is to constitute a de facto transfer of  beneficial rights through producing a documents in 
which the debtor would make a promise of  his liable performance either to the original 
creditor and the producer, or to the producer of  the document only. Such set of  the clauses 
are named by Brunner as Inhaberklauseln which mainly divided by two sub-clauses as 
alternative and pure. The former one is the clause as its name the alternation that either 
original creditor or the producer of  the document can enforce such rights147. The later one 
is the producer of  the document can solely enforce the right given that the original creditor 
assumed not enforcing his right148. Notably, there is vital indication derived from the 
inhaberklauseln that the producer of  the document does not needed to prove his title while 
enforcing the right. It can be regarded as a clause in flavour of  the creditor’s transferee. 
 
The merchant in the western Europe showed their great interest in such documents and 
these clauses kept their influence in Germany, Italy and England. The legal record in 
Germany has indicated the influence of  these two clauses. For the first clauses, in the 
Stadtbuch of  Stralsunder, there is an interest accounting record shown the similar words 
as previous mentioned Stellvertretungsklausel149. Jenks also indicated the Inhaberklausel150 by 
referring Gareis’s quotation151 from early 13th century. In a city of  northern Italy also there 
are various of  statutes and ordinances related to the negotiable instruments and its early 
form medieval contract Cambium 152 .The rare evidence to reflect the impact of  
aforementioned clauses are the Statuto Di Bologna del 1454 which showed influence of  
first set of  clauses153. The early English law also reflected such trends through referring it 
in Bracton154. Despite the fact that these clauses had provided a possible solution to 
                                                
143 Henri Brunner, ‘Titres Au Porteur Francais Du Moyen-Age, Les’ (1886) 10 Nouv Rev Hist Droit Francais Etranger 
11, 31.  
144 Various similar cases can be found in Codex diplomaticus cavensis. See: Michele Morcaldi (n 138) vol. i, n11. Mauro 
Schiani Michele Morcaldi, Codex diplomaticus cavensis: nunc primum in lucem editus curantibus dd ... (H Hoepli 1877) vol ii, n 
11,221,225,242. 
145  “per se aut per illum hominem cui ipse hanc cartulam dederit and exigendum.” See: Heinrich Brunner, Zur 
Rechtsgeschichte Der Römischen Und Germanischen Urkunde (Weidmann 1880) vol 1, 86. 
146 “vel cui istum breve in manu paruerit in vice nostra.” See: ibid. 
147 the clauses of  alternative Inhaberklausel drafted in two forms as “tibi aut eidem homini qui hunc scriptum pro 
minibus abuerit” or “mihi seu ad hominem illum, apud quem brebem iste in manu paruerit.” Former one see: Memorie e 
documenti per servire all’istoria del Ducato di Lucca (n 138) vol.ii n 825. Later one see: Michele Morcaldi (n 142) vol. ii,  n 213. 
148 “quos dabunt praedicto Radolfo vel alicui de concivibus nostris qui presentem literam presentavit coram nobis.” See: 
Hugo Loersch and Richard Schröder, Urkunden Zur Geschichte Des Deutschen Rechtes, Für Dem Gebrach Bei Vorlesungen Und 
Übungen (A Marcus 1881) n 159. 
149  “sui ispe hanc cartulam dederit ad exigendum.” See: Zeitschrift Fur Das Gesammte Handelsrecht.vol.23 (Levin 
Goldschmidt 1877) 228. 
150 Jenks (n 47) 79. 
151 Zeitschrift Fur Das Gesammte Handelsrecht.vol.21 (Levin Goldschmidt 1877) 372. 
152 In Italian “Combiatori” 
153 Statuto di Bologna del 1454 xliii, § 3 See: Georg. Friedrich von Martens, Versuch einer historischen Entwicklung des wahren 
Ursprungs des Wechselrecht ein Beitrage zur Geschichte des Handels des Mittelalters (Joh Christ Dieterich 1797) vol ii, 57. 
154 It had been called as missibilia. See: Bracton and others (n 34) f. 41b. 
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circumvent the primitive legal notion, its crude and unformed nature still required further 
development of  legal legislation and business practice to facilitate the further evolution of  
the negotiable instruments.  
 
The origins of  modern notion of  negotiable instruments like bill of  exchange should be 
tracing the documents with the similar philosophy. The philosophy of  the negotiable 
instruments are the fulfilment of  the business practice requirement of  the making the 
promise of  freeman into something like as money as possible, in the case of  bill of  
exchange is using the promise of  future purchasing power to exchange the current 
money155, which can be regarded as the barter of  same genus of  different forms. According 
to the development of  medieval business practice, the earliest documents embedded such 
philosophy are the alternative form of  innominate contract Permiutatio, called Cambium. It 
is a contract of  exchange the money in a Place A with the money in Place B156, which is a 
de facto transport a money from one place to another in a narrow sense157. In the 13th 
century, the legal authorities in northern Italy had made their own statutes to recognize the 
enforceability of  such private contract document has same enforceable power as public 
documents respectively. The Statuto di Roma 1363 provided as good example of  the 
enforcement of  the private contract158 with respect to the ancient statutes of  Rome Legal 
Merchants159. Such recognitions of  the enforceability can be also founded in Vallassina in 
1343160, Intra in 1393161, Piacenza in 1391162, etc.  
 
At the same time, the development of  aforementioned Cambium has been indicated by 
the legislation as bill of  exchange163 firstly in Statuto di Perugia in 1342164 and later 
followed by Forlì, Piacenza,Verona, Bologna, Bergamo and Persaro, etc in 300 years165. 
However, till the Statuto di Piacenza in 1391166 , there is still nothing said about the 
                                                
155 Commons, Legal foundations of capitalism (n 1) 250. 
156 “hoc tanum interesse inter cambium et permutationem quod haec propria sit specie ad speciem, illud autem specicei.” 
See: Iohannes Marquardus, Tractatus politico-juridicus de jure mercatorum et commerciorum singulari (1662) ii.12,22. 
157 Detail research of  the verities of  the form of  Cambium can be founded in Holdsworth article which indicated the 
vital role of  Cambium in the development of  Bill of  Exchange. See: Holdsworth, ‘Origins and Early History of 
Negotiable Instruments I’ (n 133) 24–29. 
158 In the Statute 1363, there is a section titled “de executione apodixarum scriptarum manu propria.” See:Francesco 
Schupfer, Il Diritto Delle Obbligazioni in Italia: Nell’età Del Risorgimento (fratelli Bocca 1921) vol 3 i, 125. 
159 “statuimus et ordinamus quod eodem modo et forma servetur in apodixis scriptis manu debitori qua recognita seu 
per ipsum scriptorem seu per testes executioni mandetur ut supra narratur.”  See: Giuseppe Gatti, Statuti dei mercanti di 
Roma (Arnaldo Forni 1980) 132. 
160  GIULIANO SCARSELLI, ‘Sulla Necessità Di Ampliare L’ambito Dei Titoli Esecutivi Nonché L’accesso 
All’esecuzione Forzata’ [2012] Giusto Proc Civ, n 48. 
161 ibid n 50. 
162 ibid 51. 
163 In Italian “la lettera di cambio’ 
164  “Statuimo e ordenamo che quegnunque persona fosse tenuta dare ad alcuno alcuna quantitade de pecunia, e avesse 
overo averà per scripta de cambiadore che deveto aggia pagato aprovata per gl'auditore del cambio, cioè la scripta del 
cambiatore, aggia forza de refiudanza e de stromento confessionato piubeco, legetemamente facto e confecto entra gle 
credetore e devetore, si che per vera e legetema refiudanza de piubeco estrumento confessionato e de refiudanza sia 
avuta la dieta scripta del cambiatore.” See: Perugia. and Giustiniano Degli Azzi Vitelleschi, Statuti di Perugia dell’anno 1342 
(E Loescher & C) 295. 
165 SCARSELLI (n 158) 12 n 55-60. 
166 “Statuimus quod si aliquis mercator vel campsor dixerit coram potestate vel eius iudice de aliquo cive Forlivii quod 
sibi debeat dare denarios usque ad quantitatem centum solidorum ravennatium inclusive prò panno ... potestas et eius 
iudex teneatur facere iurare creditorem et debitorem de veritate dicenda et in causa procedere summarie, simpliciter et 
de plano, strepitu et figura iuditii prorsus exclusis” See: Georg Friedrich von Martens (n 151) 18. 
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negotiability in bill of  exchange167. Meanwhile the notion of  the bill of  exchange in France 
was mentioned by the Ordinance of  Louis XI in 1462 as lectres de change168. The earliest 
statutes on Europe Continent admitting the transferability of  bill of  exchange (letter of  
exchange at that time) was the Ordinance issued by magistrates of  Barcelona in 1384 
through accepting the endorsement on the documents169. However, in the civil law country, 
such as France had observed a phenomenon that the formal clauses in flavour of  the 
creditor’s transferee seems disappeared in the 15th and 16th century due to the ignoring the 
distinctions between two relevant clauses170 during the conception the civil law. It was 
finally solved by the civil law tradition by an Ordinance issued in the 1673171 to indicate 
that endorsement and order of  the bond172  containing the Inhaberklausel emerged in 
Lübeck173 in 15th century and the bearer with a bearer form of  the negotiable instrument 
were not enabled to bring action until the 1721174. 
 
The development of  negotiable instruments is more complicated due to the English 
common law custom. It is also the very important part of  the modern legal infrastructure 
due to the great influence of  the Anglo-American legal tradition on the modern business 
world. For the brevity’s sake175, such development of  the negotiable instrument can be 
divided into the recognition of  the bill of  exchange and the recognition of  promissory 
note. 
 
The earliest case in England recognizing the negotiability of  the bill of  exchange is the 
case of  Martin v. Boure, it is a matter of  the foreign bill of  exchange, of  which the 
negotiability was affirmed due to its importance in the international trade in 1601176. For 
the inland bill of  exchange in England, the three aforementioned characteristics177 of  
negotiability should be identified case by case. 
 
Firstly, the recognition of  the characteristic that the title has been incorporated with the 
paper document, which the holder of  the document does not need to prove his title thus 
the bona fide transferee can acquire a good even if  the transferor had defective title or no 
title, stalled by the unclear defining feature of  the rights of  bearers. In the case of  the bill 
of  exchange as bearer instruments, the bearer can hardly be regarded as the attorney or 
the nominee of  the grantor nor as the assignor in the equitable assignment of  the ‘chose 
in action’, it ought to be treated as taking the full title from the grantor in which there 
                                                
167 Jenks (n 135) 71. 
168 François-André Isambert and others, Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises depuis l’an 420 jusqu’à la Révolution française... 
Tome XXVII, Tome XXVII, (Belin-Leprieur ; Plon frères 1827) vol x, 451-456. 
169 Georg Friedrich von Martens (n 151) 107. 
170 “on n’y vit plus qu’un mandat” and “vel cui mandaveris” See: Louis Debray and Louis Debray, ‘De la représentation 
en justice par le cognitor : droit romain ; La clause à ordre : droit français’ (V Giard & E Brière 1892) 36. 
171 Isambert and others (n 166) xix,100. 
172 It was later developed into the modern form of  negotiable instruments in the European continent. For detail of  the 
illustration see: Jenks (n 135) 80–85. 
173 Loersch and Schröder (n 146) n 317. 
174 WS Holdsworth, ‘Origins and Early History of Negotiable Instruments IV’ (1916) 32 LQ Rev 20, 25. 
175 For detail of  the discussion of  the development and origin of  the negotiable instrument in England see: WS 
Holdsworth, ‘Origins and Early History of Negotiable Instruments III’ (1915) 31 LQ Rev 376. And Holdsworth, ‘Origins 
and Early History of Negotiable Instruments IV’ (n 172). 
176 ‘Martin v Boure (1601) Cro Jac 6, 79 ER 5’ [1601] Engl Rep. 
177 Supra, note 133 
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should only be the direct contract between bearer and grantor178. Such opinion has been 
clearly stated by the justice in the case of  Crawley v. Crowther in 1702179. 
 
Secondly, that the consideration is presumed in the effective transaction is recognized by 
the Lex Mercatoria through the recognition of  the necessity of  receiving values which can 
be used to examine the validity of  the bill of  exchange180. 
 
Finally, on the issue of  the mode of  transfer, the case Hodges v. Steward has indicated that 
the bill of  exchange can be transferred by endorsement and delivery once such bill was 
payable to the bearer or order to pay to the grantee181 and such endorsement is acted in a 
manner of  the transfer of  rights182 in 1693. The mode of  transfer has been completed by 
the case of  William v. Field that every endorsement created a new bill for the grantee to 
have the right to bring actions to get money paid in 1693183. The cases illustrated above are 
the legal recognition of  the negotiability of  both inland and foreign bill of  exchange in 
English legal custom. 
 
As stated above, the English common law system spent the whole 17th century to recognize 
the mercantile custom of  bill of  exchange. In the late 17th century, the English lawyers 
tried to use the analogy method to persuade the court to admit the legitimacy and 
negotiability of  promissory notes. In the case of  Shelden v Hentley, the bearer is allowed to 
bring action on a sealed note while an anverment of  the payment has been made to the 
bearer of  such note in 1681184. However, such attempts were not successful due to Holt’s 
opposing the recognition of  promissory notes. In the case of  Buller v. Crips, Holt took the 
promissory note as the invention of  Goldsmith in London who had the intention to make 
a legal recognition of  their binding all documents they dealt with, which would lead to a 
carrying any liens through the note. Those note in Holt’s opinion are that those notes from 
legal perspective are the “evidence of  parol contract” into a specialty and he questioned 
whether the granter of  notes can transfer a better right to the nominee185. Through the 
argument he made in Ckerke v. Martin that notes payable to others are not bill of  exchange 
which made the notes non-negotiable 186 . Therefore, such Holt’s insistence has been 
                                                
178 Thomas Atkins Street, The Foundations of Legal Liability: History and Theory of English Contract Law (Edward Thompson 
Co 1906) vol ii, 370–71. 
179 ‘Crawley v Crowther - (1702) 22 ER 1194’ [1702] Engl Rep. 
180 Wyndham Beawes and Thomas Mortimer, Lex Mercatoria Rediviva, Or, A Complete Code of Commercial Law : Being a 
General Guide to All Men in Business ... : With an Account of Our Mercantile Companies, Our Colonies and Factories Abroad, Our 
Commercial Treaties with Foreign Powers, the Duty of Consuls, and of the Laws Concerning Aliens, Naturalization, and Denization : To 
Which is Added a Sketch of the Present State of the Commerce of the Whole World ... (J Rice 1761) 74. 
181 ‘Hodges v Steward - (1693) 91 ER 696’ [1693] Engl Rep. 
182 The argument in the Hodge v. Steward’s Case opposed what Holt said in the Steward v. Hodge’s Case that “A bill of  
exchange is made to A. B. or bearer, A. B. indorses it, and the indorsee brought an action; and upon a demurrer, adjudged 
that it did not lie; for it cannot be indorsed, it not being made to A. B. or order, and the bearer cannot have  an action 
upon a bill of  exchange; for he has no interest as bearer; but it being paid to the bearer, it is sufficient payment to 
discharge the party who pays it; but it does not give the bearer such an interest that he can maintain an action.” See: 
‘Steward v Hodges - (1692) 90 ER 962’ [1692] Engl Rep. 
183 “every indorsement is a new bill and implies a warren by the indorser that the money shall be paid.” See:‘Williams v 
Field - (1693) 91 ER 696’ [1693] Engl Rep. 
184 “a bearer allowed to sue on a note under seal promising to pay the bearer who delivered the note.” See: ‘Shelden v 
Hentley (1681) 2 Show 160, 89 ER 860’ [1681] Engl Rep. 
185 ‘Buller v Crips (1703) 6 Mod Rep 29, 87 ER 793’ (n 21). 
186 ‘Clerke v Martin - (1702) 92 ER 6’ [1702] Engl Rep. 
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reversed by the legislation intervention from the parliament in 1705 which gave remedy 
upon promissory notes187. Finally, the case of  Grant v. Vaughan can be regarded as the case 
to finish the 200-year development of  negotiable instrument and construct the modern 
form of  negotiability in 1764188. 
3.3 Modern Notion of  Property: Significance of  Property Right in Securities 
As indicated in section 3.1 and 3.2, the clear transformation from the primitive notion of  
property to the modern notion of  property has taken place. In the tradition of  Anglo-
American private law, the property refers rights in the nature of  ownership and the 
property rights request the alienability and enforceability of  such right against the third 
party. Therefore, the alienability and enforceability of  the aforementioned ‘chose in action’ 
de facto constituted the elements of  the property rights, which leads to the extension of  
the ‘chose in action’ as property. Meanwhile, some primitive notion of  the property still 
has its influence on the presentation of  modern property rights. In the case of  Blackstone 
v. Miller, the justice reiterated the norms inherited from property law based on the 
possession that if  a thing can not be physically handled yet that such physical handling can 
be achieved and recognized by law through symbolizing it on another physical things189 
which can be handled190. 
 
Firstly, the significance of  property rights in securities is the extension of  the scope of  
property from merely tangible things to the incorporeal and intangible things. The 
extension of  the scope of  property facilitated a very important change in the definition of  
property which has been firstly recognized by American justice in the case of  Chicago, M. 
& St. PR Co. v. Minnesota in the late 19th century. Justice Field firstly approved the definition 
of  property as exchange value of  property191. Such transformation led to the changed 
treatment of  the property which is liberated the property from the physical and tangible 
objects to something intangible like the rights to against others. Therefore, the extension 
of  the scope of  the property rights to incorporeal and intangible things has indicated as 
Ely summarized, that the essence of  property is in the relation among persons arising out 
of  their relation over things192. On one hand, the property can be still regarded as the 
physical objects as it used to be. One the other hand, the property became a bundle of  
rights derived from the expected activities including the acquiring, using and exchanging 
such things based on their ownership. This is the essence of  the property as exchange 
value of  property which takes the property as marketable assets.  
 
Such process, from the law and economists’ point of  view, is the legal authorities turned 
their attention from the use-value of  the property, which has been incorporated into the 
                                                
187 England and Wales., 3&4 Anne. c.9,1705: An Act for Giving like Remedy upon Promissory Notes, as is Now Used upon Bills 
of Exchange : And for the Better Payment of Inland-Bills of Exchange. (Printed by Charles Bill, and the executrix of Thomas 
Newcomb, deceas’d] ; 1704). 
188 ‘Grant v Vaughan - (1764) 97 ER 957’ [1764] Engl Rep. 
189 In the case of  securities, as mentioned above, is usually a paper documents achieved by a writ of  debt. 
190 Blackstone v Miller 188 189 (us Supreme Court 1903). 
191 Chicago, M & St PR Co v Minnesota 134 418, 458 (us Supreme Court 1890). 
192 Ely and others (n 5) 96. 
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internal economy of  the household in the process of  producing and consuming of  the 
means of  production, to the exchange-value of  the property which is the incorporeal and 
behavioural market-value obtaining the expectation in the exchange of  means of  
production in the market while selling them. The distinction of  use-value and exchange-
value is that the former one is increasing the total wealth of  the society through increasing 
the quantity of  use-value from the increasing production supply capacity and the later one 
is increasing the total wealth of  the society by the bargaining power to increase or maintain 
the exchange-value via intervening the supply and demand scale. The relationship between 
the increasing production supply capacity and the increasing of  the use-value can be easily 
proved by the intuition even in the primitive society. However, the later one is the merit of  
the development of  the modern capitalism which utilizes and allocate the capital to its 
most efficient use.  
 
Following example is used to prove the linkage between the bargaining power and the 
increasing of  the total wealth of  the society under the context of  game theory.  
 
A and B lived in a small village. A have a stamp book. The utility of  possessing and using 
such book is £500. B is keen on collecting the stamps and he just received £1000 from his 
grandma. A decided to buy the stamp book from B. The utility of  possessing and using 
such book to B is £800. Since there is difference between the buyer and seller’s utility, there 
are possibility of  bargaining. The presumptions of  the transaction are if  the transactions 
are voluntary, A will agree to sell if  B bids over £500. B will agree to buy if  quote from X 
is under £800. Therefore, the transaction price will between £500-800.  
 
Under the transactions of  game theory, moving economic goods193 from A to B will create 
£300 in value, which using terms in economics are cooperative surplus. However, the 
process of  the bargaining is the distribution the the cooperative surplus will not change 
the value of  cooperative surplus. The only factor will influence the surplus is the break of  
the bargaining which means they can’t reach an agreement.  
 
The value of  cooperative solution can be calculated without given a exact transaction price. 
Supposing they make an agreement that distribute £X of  the surplus to A, the value of  
cooperative solution will be  
 
800+ [1000-(500+X)] + (500+X) =£1800. 
(the value of  the stamp books by B) (the remaining money kept by B) (the money made from the transaction) 
 
The value of  non-cooperative solution will be the value of  stamp book by A and the 
money kept by B which in total is the 500+1000=£1500. The net surplus between the 
cooperative and non-cooperative solution is £300. The intuition we can learn from this 
example are the action of  bargaining increase the total wealth of  the society.  
 
While using the analogy to the circulation of  capital, we can observe that the free 
                                                
193 From the legal perspective private property. 
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circulation of  capital increases the total wealth of  the society, which is partly the second 
significance of  the property rights insecurities. The property rights in the securities enabled 
the capital holders to utilize their capital regarding to their risk endurance. The 
enforcement of  the modern form of  contract together with the property rights in 
securities building the trust among the creditor and debtor and provide the real right for 
the investor to claim back their money. Secondly, the property rights in the securities194 
has enabled the circulation of  such paper documents. The capitalist and the institution of  
capitalism can hardly survive if  the interest rate at a 15% or 30% level per year. If  the 
securities can circulate, to achieve the same amount of  economic effect, the interest rate 
would be as lower as 5% with multiple time of  the circulation. Hence, the free circulation 
of  securities enable the whole capitalist societies operated in the relatively low cost of  
capital to achieve an optimized development in the past 300 years. 
 
The third significance of  the property rights in securities are entitled the owner an exclusive 
power to exercise his rights over the property and these rights will be prevented the third 
person’s disturbance and torts via various laws and remedies. Hence, the property rights in 
the securities compared to the contractual rights against person have a stronger power to 
protect the rights of  the investor or creditors. The forth significance of  the property rights 
in securities are the recognition of  the ownership of  the shares in the corporates. 
Therefore, it is the premise of  the internalization of  the social cost which is also the 
incentive effects to increase the total welfare of  the society195. 
 
  
                                                
194 These securities used to be the contract or the promise indicated the personal creditor and debtor relations. 
195 This is the theoretical foundation of  Coase’s natural of  the firm which related to the key of  his transactional cost. 
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4.  Dematerialization & Immobilization of Modern Securities 
in Capital Markets: Legal Responses to Adapt the 
Changes196 
4.1   Legal Aspect of  Dematerialization and Immobilization 
The trends of  dematerialization and immobilization of  the securities are proposed by 
Lybrand Report after the event of  ‘paper crunch’ happened in 1960s197. The campaign of  
dematerialization has been introduced to the capital market as the response remedy to the 
crisis 198 . The essential of  the dematerialization replaced paper documents with the 
electronic record system. Meanwhile, the essential of  the immobilization is the creation of  
the Central Securities Depository, which led to the elimination of  the circulation of  paper 
securities. These two trends are the ultimate solution to the concern of  ‘paper crunch’ in 
most of  the counties. 
 
The concept of  the dematerialization indicates the process of  turning traditional registered 
securities with the paper certificate as evidence of  the title into the securities merely 
registered in books, which are usually an electronic system, kept by the issuer or the agency 
on behalf  of  the issuer rather than issuing any paper certificate. In the case of  registered 
securities, above transformation is about the procedure change. However, the attempt of  
dematerialization of  securities in bearer form fundamentally shook the legal nature of  the 
bearer securities as well as the well-functioning legal infrastructure of  the negotiability 
developed in last 500 years. If  the bearer securities have been dematerialized, the bearer 
instruments will become an intangible property. As indicated in the section 3, the bearer 
securities is the paper documents incorporated title within such documents as the symbol 
to facilitated the requirement of  negotiability via handing over or delivery of  the 
documents, which is the comprise of  the primitive notion of  law of  possession. Hence, 
the process of  the dematerialization, the bearer securities will be invalid due to the absence 
of  the paper document of  title. This is the most vital proprietary problem caused by the 
bearer instrument caused by the dematerialization of  bearer securities. 
 
The process of  the registered securities has not changed fundamentally, since being 
intangible does not remove the title and form of  ownership of  the registered securities, 
even if  they are not in a physical sense. The claims of  the securities still belong to the 
holder of  the securities registered on the issuers’ book either maintained by the issuer or 
issuer’s agency. Such claim is proprietary against the underlying property. Hence, the 
                                                
196 This section is the rifacimento mainly based on author’s LITF course essay in 2016. 
197 Sidney M Robbins, Paper Crisis in the Securities Industry: Causes and Cures: Is the Stock Certificate Necessary? (Lybrand, Ross 
Bros & Montgomery 1969) 104–22. 
198 ibid 123–36. 
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process of  dematerialization didn't make these registered securities fungible even if  these 
registered securities are standardized. In other words, the holder of  such proprietary claims 
is in the different stance compared to the holder of  the monetary claims in a depositor-
banker relation. Moreover, the problem of  bona fide purchaser, the settlement, clearance 
and finality problem will arise due to the different manner in transactions comparing to 
the traditional physical delivery of  the documents. All of  the transactions of  
dematerialized securities take place in the electronic system.   
 
The process of  immobilization of  the securities requires the corporation of  all the 
participants199 in the markets to store both their and their customers’ securities in the CSD 
in order to achieve the goal of  eliminating the circulation of  securities certificates. With 
the idea of  immobilization, CSDs plays as the role of  central place to deposit all the issued 
securities and establish book-entry system to substitute the traditional circulation of  
certificates. In case of  bearer securities and negotiable instruments, the dilemma caused by 
dematerialization can be solved by keep their traditional paper form unchanged at the 
CSDs level and transfer the titles through a book-entry, which will be discussed in the later 
part. The legal consequence of  CSD is that the securities have been indirectly held by 
intermediaries, so called intermediated securities and needed a revisit of  the traditional 
legal infrastructure based on the notion of  symbolized possession which has been 
illustrated in section 3.2. Therefore, the property rights problems in the new created system 
also needed to be investigated. 
 
4.2   Property Rights in Intermediated Securities 
As response to the immobilization, it seems to be out of  date for the traditional notion of  
physical possession of  the securities. A new norm should be set to facilitate the needs of  
presenting the property rights in the securities. Hence, the notion of  securities entitlement 
has been created for the depositor against their depositories as the replacement of  physical 
possession of  the securities. The notion of  securities entitlement is defined as the “rights 
and property interest of  entitlement holder to a financial asset”200 in a indirectly held 
system under the UCC 8-102 in 1994. In a tiered system, the securities entitlement became 
the replacement of  the paper evidence of  the title to the property and how the 
intermediaries manage the securities entitlements became a vital issue in the property rights 
in the intermediated securities. In the current business custom, the securities entitlements 
are expressed in the securities accounts and the transfer of  the securities are achieved by 
the credit and debt on the securities account of  different end-investors. From the form of  
the securities account, it seems to be similar to the bank account. However, these two 
forms of  accounts are different due to the property right in the securities. For the bank 
account, although the relationship between the depositor and banker were the bailment at 
the origin, after the emergence of  modern banking industry, their relationship became a 
                                                
199 These participants are intermediaries and other institutional investors. 
200 American Law Institute. and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws., Uniform Commercial 
Code : Official Text and Comments (West 2009)8-102. 
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creditor and debtor relationship and the claim of  the bank account holder is the monetary 
contractual claim, which can be fungible. However, in the case of  securities account, If  the 
claim from the entitlement against the higher tier of  the system is monetary contractual 
claim, the property rights in the securities will be eliminated which is the reaction to the 
past 500 years’ efforts to securities as property. Moreover, the consequence of  such legal 
treatment will shake the foundation of  the modern capitalism. Hence, the claim must be 
proprietary claim.  
 
The entitlement of  the end-investors can be merely used against intermediaries in the next 
higher level rather than the the intermediaries in the higher level of  system with the notion 
of  compartmentalisation. Meanwhile, the entitlements against the CSD are only held by 
the intermediaries in one level lower than the CSD level201. Hence, no pass-through right 
arising in the system202. 
 
The legal relationship between the end-investor and higher intermediaries and 
intermediaries in each adjacent levels should be identified. In the Anglo-American legal 
system, there are in total two possible relations to achieve the proprietary claim against the 
former tier in the system. One is bailment and another is trusteeship. Supposing the 
relationship in the tiered system is bailment, it is easy to find that the interest in securities 
became the barrier to recognized the validity of  the bailment. As mentioned in the 
previous section, the legal treatment of  the interest in securities is categorized them into 
intangible property, which is incapable to be in physical possession. Due to the restriction 
of  the bailment under the Anglo-American legal tradition, which underlying property of  
the bailment needed to be tangible, the fact that the interests in securities as intangible 
assets made that it is not proper to describe the such legal relation as bailment203. Therefore, 
the trusteeship became the only and proper explanation of  the indicated relation in the 
system and the securities entitlement can be treated as the beneficial ownership under the 
legal arrangement of  trusteeship. 
 
Since the notion of  beneficial ownership and trusteeship is an Anglo-American legal 
concept and it can’t be used as the explanation under the civil law system if  they didn't 
admit the trusteeship, the notion of  the pro rata co-ownership is the only possible way to 
explain the securities entitlement. Among almost all the civil law countries in the world, 
Germany is the only country whose legal system attempted to establish the complete legal 
framework for the securities entitlement under the civil law system’s interpretation of  the 
proprietary right, while the outcome seems not to be convincing after hard effort204. The 
statute of  Depotgesetz (DepG)205 firstly allowed the holding of  Sammelverwarung (fungible 
                                                
201 Royston Miles Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (Sweet & Maxwell 2003)6-08. 
202 This is an improvement of  the revised version of  the UCC to revoke the pass-through rights within the system 
avoiding the potential conflict of  proprietary claims in the system. See: Jan Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on Transnational 
Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law Volume 2: Contract and Movable Property Law (Bloomsbury Publishing 2013) 
615 n. 461. 
203 The Bailee shall be in possession of  the bailor’s goods. See: Roufos v Brewster and Brewster 1971 218 (us 1971). 
204 Dalhuisen (n 200) 616. 
205 Georg Opitz and Germany., Gesetz über die verwahrung und anschaffung von wertpapieren (Depotgesetz) vom 4. februar 1937, 
nebst einem anhang : schrankfachvertrag und verschlossene einlage (W de Gruyter & Co 1937). 
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securities), which is the earliest notion of  pooled securities in modern German law. 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB) is the main source for proprietary claim of  the securities, 
transfer of  the securities and the essential of  the form of  entitlements. In general, the 
relation of  the securities intermediary and the CSD are a form of  custody under a specific 
contract206. The legal problem under the such civil law system is the unclear ownership 
structure of  the indirectly held system. Since the end-investor in the domestic German law 
must be and ultimately marked as the the legal owner of  the securities in the chain systems 
among the intermediaries, it is a challenge to complied such requirement under the 
traditional notions of  possession. Hence, the depository, under such context, is merely 
treated as the holder of  the securities for the end-investors207. The possession is depended 
on an obligatory right under the form of  custody with the intermediaries and there is only 
contractual rights for the end-investors to reach their intermediaries. 
 
Above solution still kept the problem of  unclear ownership remained, due to the title of  
the paper document is not clearly presented and the property rights of  securities can not 
be protected without a manner of  possession. Therefore, the analogy of  the dematerialized 
securities with registered securities under the act in 1940208 can be applied to offer a 
proprietary protection through the separation of  holdership and property rights. 
Therefore, the depositories have merely a right to hold the securities and the end-investors 
remain their property rights, which enabled themselves under the protection by bringing 
the proprietary actions. The pass-through rights of  the end-investors has been partly 
eliminated, but still remains in requesting the paper or physical delivery of  the securities 
which can be regarded as the remaining influence of  the primitive notion of  the possession. 
This is the weakness of  the German civil law under the trends of  dematerialization and 
immobilization of  the securities, which finally led the introduction of  the notion of  
beneficial ownership interest to facilitate the growing demand of  harmonization in 
Europe209. 
 
Finally, the maintenance of  the securities account is requested that the proprietary claims 
of  the securities can not be fungible which led to the segregation of  the end-investors’ 
securities and the brokerages’ securities in order to establish a valid trusteeship210.  
 
                                                
206 Burgerliches Gesetzbuch Mit dem Ausfuhrungsgesetz und Einem Ausfuhrlichen Alphabetischen Sachregister. (1896) Verwahrung, s 
688. 
207 ibid unmittelbarer Allein und Fremdbesitzer, s 825. 
208 Georg Opitz, Depotgesetz. Gesetz über die Verwahrung und Anschaffung von Wertpapieren vom 4. Februar 1937: Nebst einem 
ausführlichen Anhang: Schrankfächer und Verwahrstücke und zahlreiche Anlagen (Walter de Gruyter 1955) 647 
Sammelverwaltungsverordnung. 
209 Dalhuisen (n 200) 617. 
210 The fungible of  the pool of  securities will lead to the problem of  commingling of  the securities and cause the 
uncertainty of  the subject matter of  the trusteeship. See:Joanna Benjamin, Interests in Securities: A Proprietary Law Analysis 
of the International Securities Markets (Oxford University Press, 2000) 23. 
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4.3   Transfer of  the Property Rights in Securities: Clearing, Settlement and 
Finality 
As mentioned in the previous section, the traditional transfer of  the bearer securities is 
handing over the paper-documents where there is no needs for the clearance and 
settlement. However, while taking the legal consequence of  dematerialization and 
immobilization of  securities into consideration, the issues became much more complicated. 
 
After the dematerialization and immobilization, the transfer of  property rights in securities 
can be regarded as an assignment, which is a very traditional form of  the right transfer 
mentioned in 3.2.1. Thus, the notion of  the abstraction and independence211 shall be 
applied to the transfer of  the property rights. The protection of  the bona fide purchaser 
(assignee) in the transaction is also introduced as so-called priority of  the transferee. The 
introduction of  these notions is for the well and smooth operation of  the tiered system. 
 
The invention of  the clearing function of  CSD, derived from the concept of  clearing, 
provides an opportunity for the parties to modify the contractual obligation which can 
support the process of  settlement through novation and netting212 . The function of  
settlement stands more at the position of  purchasers of  the property right. With the help 
of  settlement, the CSD transforms the purchaser’s personal contractual claim against the 
vender to the proprietary claim against the whole world which keeps the purchaser away 
from the credit risk of  the vendor. 
 
Within the procedure of  the transaction settlement, the credit risk, insolvency risk and the 
legal risk of  the intermediaries needed to be considered. The notion of  the finality is 
created in order to protect the beneficiaries from those risks. Thus, the promotion of  the 
finality can be regarded as the vital part of  the protection of  the purchaser’s property rights 
in the securities.  
 
Usually the promotion of  the finality can be achieved by (1) introduction of  the notion of  
abstraction and independence of  transfer (2) opposing for the notion of  capacity and 
intention. (3) protection from the bona fide purchaser and (4) notion of  reliance of  the 
transferee who used to own the property rights213. 
 
  
                                                
211 Dalhuisen (n 200) 419. 
212 Benjamin (n 208) 23. 
213 Dalhuisen (n 200) 622. 
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5.  Conclusion 
This dissertation tried to conducted a law and economic analysis of  the property rights in 
the securities. The author firstly offered an economic explanation of  the securities in the 
modern capitalism infrastructure and put it under the classical institutional economics’ 
theoretical framework with the comprehensive illustration of  the legal categorization as 
well as the attempted to distinguish the difference between money market instruments and 
capital market instruments in section 2.1. In section 2.2, the premise relating to the 
property has been discussed for better understanding of  the later analysis. In the section 
3, the author traced the development of  the securities as ‘chose in action’ and the legal 
recognition of  ‘chose in action’ as property to complete the investigation of  the origin of  
the property rights in the securities via fulfil the assessment of  the enforceability and 
alienability. Moreover, the significance of  the securities as property has been indicated (1) 
the increasing the total wealth of  the society through price discovery. (2) increasing the 
speed of  capital circulation and release high interest rate burden for the capitalism society 
at the beginning. (3) the exclusive power leads incentive effects at micro-level. (4) the 
recognition of  the ownership of  the shares in corporates as the premise of  the 
internalization of  the corporation, which also have incentive effects to increase the total 
wealth of  the society. In the final section, the legal responses to the dematerialization and 
immobilization of  the securities has been discussed to show the attempt of  the legal 
system to maintain the well-functioning of  the economy. 
 
In conclusion, the property as a social institution is the security for the existence of  social 
order and incentive mechanism to flourish the whole society. The participants in it are 
benefited and regulated by such security. The emergence of  property rights in securities as 
‘chose in action’ changed the way of  interpretation of  the economic society, wealth 
generation and wealth distribution from primitive notion of  use-value of  property to the 
combination of  former one with the exchange-value of  property as exchangeable assets. 
During the development of  such expansion, the common law is a good indicators of  
existing social norm & recognition and the law of  equity and statutes law are the facilitators 
of  the well-functioning of  the whole society by preventing them from the hinders coming 
from the primitive common law norms, which indicated the intension of  philosophy of  
law is for the well-functioning of  society and flourishing social justice & order instead of  
being dogmatism. The circumvention of  existing norms to adapt the new notions is better 
than the total radical revolution to fragment the integration of  legal infrastructure from 
conservative and prudential purpose. 
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